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The problem of reductionism in educational theory: complexity, causality, values 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to examine some of the problems in current policy, pedagogy and practice through 
the concept of 'reductionism'. It examines various forms which this may take involving 
inappropriate scientific methodologies, a diminished sense of structure (or conversely, agency), 
temporal confusion, and teleological / ethical reductionism, drawing on examples from natural and 
social sciences as well as education. It draws on Critical Realist understandings of causality, 
stratification and emergence to ground the discussion ontologically and epistemologically. The 
article then builds on this theoretical foundation for a critical discussion of teaching and learning, 
poverty-related underachievement, school development, and evidence-based teaching.  
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Introduction 
This article draws on the concept of reductionism to examine inadequate theorisation and 
mechanistic causal assumptions in education, which result in a loss of complexity, openness and 
values. This seems particularly appropriate at present for England and similar systems, where 
reductionist approaches have become hegemonic in many aspects of schooling. In recent years a 
strident ideological campaign, led by government ministers, has sought to reconceptualise and 
reconfigure what counts as educational achievement, high quality teaching, social justice and 
research evidence. This involves not only the depoliticisation of politics and policy (Harvey 
2010:218-9) but but also a shift towards a technical discourse when considering curricular and 
pedagogical issues and practices (Shapiro 1990:13; Clarke 2012).   
A critique of reductionism is important, therefore, to protect against misleading simplifications. 
Although the concept is relatively familiar in the natural and social sciences (see Bock and Goode 
1998, Sayer 2010) it has rarely been highlighted in the field of education, where its use has 
generally either been applied to very specific issues or used as a vague term of abuse. (Some 
honourable but rare exceptions are referred to below eg Apple 1984; Beck 2007.) For that reason, 
this article attempts to map different forms of reductionism, drawing on debates in natural and 
social sciences. Further, to ground this in a coherent ontology and epistemology, it refers to theories 
of causality, stratification and emergence in Critical Realism. It moves on to reflect on important 
manifestations of reductionism in education, involving pedagogical theory, poverty and 
underachievement, school evaluation and change, and evidence-based practice.  
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Reductionism affects policy and administrative systems as well as related research paradigms, but 
goes right down to fundamental assumptions about learning and knowledge. In practical terms, 
reductionism is disempowering because it denies to professionals, as well as policy makers, the 
understanding they need to operate skilfully and with agency in challenging situations. 
Reductionism, in various forms, depends too much on surface readings of reality, reinforcing 
'common sense' assumptions. It obscures, distorts or simply fails to perceive the power dimension 
of what it studies. This results in ideological misrepresentation which disempowers practitioners.  
The concept of reductionism   
Reductionism takes many forms but generally signifies a loss of complexity which hinders an 
adequate understanding of reality. In its classic usage, it refers to the inappropriate deployment of 
one scientific discipline to explain matters which require a different branch of science. This is 
described, metaphorically, as using too 'low' a science, for example trying to explain biological 
phenomena mainly through chemistry, or complex social situations such as war in terms of 
aggressive animal instincts.  
Reductionism is not however limited to this idea of a 'hierarchy' of sciences. More generally, it can 
also refer to the 'omission of important co-determinants of a multi-causal situation' (Sayer 
(2010:34), or the choice of an inappropriate perspective or conceptual framework. It is for this 
reason that Rose (2005:95) insists on ontological unity but epistemological pluralism. Using the 
example of a frog jumping into a pond (ibid:100-13), it is perfectly valid to study the biochemical 
properties of its muscles but this will not explain why now. Its reaction to a nearby snake requires 
other explanations including intellligent evasion or instinctive reactions rewarded by natural 
selection. The argument goes back a long way, indeed it is prefigured by Aristotle's model of four 
complementary types of causality: material, formal, efficient and final causes. Drawing on and 
moving beyond Sayer (2010), I will attempt in this section to map out various directions which 
reductionism can take.  
It may be, however, that we are also dealing with something in the Zeitgeist - a certain haste in 
finding fast answers and quick policy fixes, along with the eclipsing of philosophical discussion in 
public life. Daniel Dennett (1995:82) speaks of a 'greedy reductionism':  
In their eagerness for a bargain, in their zeal to explain too much too fast, scientists and 
philosophers... underestimate the complexities, trying to skip whole layers or levels of 
theory in their rush to fasten everything securely and neatly to the foundation.   
Scientific stratification 
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a) The problem here involves explaining phenomena through too 'low' a science. Sayer (2010:5) 
presents the metaphor of various 'layers', starting at the 'bottom' with the physical, then the 
chemical, biological, and finally the social. (He leaves open the possibility that the psychological 
sits at a different 'level' to the social.) The 'lower' explanations cannot be ignored: for example, 
biological powers are dependent on but irreducible to physical and chemical laws.  
It has become commonplace to argue that the dominance of physics ended with a 20th Century 
crisis in that discipline such as the uncertainty principle. However the need to differentiation the 
fundamental principles of different sciences came much earlier. Prigogine and Stengers (2017) trace 
the first challenge to Newtonian physics to advances in chemistry in the late 18th Century. Writing 
towards the end of the 19th Century, Friedrich Engels points to Hegel's early grasp of qualitative 
differences between 'mechanics, chemics and organics' [Engels 1964:253, also note 203]. Engels 
recognises that Newtonian physics deals with movements between solid objects, whereas chemistry 
deals with the internal changes of matter. A major transformation occurs with life, whereby 
chemical processes involving proteins become 'a self-acting, permanent chemical process' 
(ibid:259).  He remarks on the development of structures from which new levels of activity emerge:   
Vertebrates. Their essential character: the grouping of the whole body about the nervous 
system. Thereby the development of self-consciousness, etc., becomes possible. (ibid:314) 
Engels has a clear understanding of emergence in nature, traced by the development of the higher 
sciences, and that the lower sciences still apply to living things, but also directly highlights the 
dangers of reductionism:  
One day we shall certainly "reduce" thought experimentally to molecular and chemical 
motions in the brain; but does that exhaust the essence of thought? (ibid:251)    
All of this is a long way from the caricatures of Marxism as mechanistic materialism, found in 
postmodernist and 'new materialist' writings, and this understanding of the dynamic complexity of 
the natural world provides a basis for challenging reductionism in the field  of education.  
b) The reverse can also be a problem, i.e. the danger of trying to explain an event or change through 
psychological or cultural factors alone without considering material or economic issues. Sayer 
(2010:6) calls this 'upward reduction', including the idea that 'everything is cultural'  or discursive, 
or explaining public events entirely through psychological motivations or individual desires. He 
critiques interpretivism as a 'tendency to reduce social life wholly to the level of meaning, ignoring 
material change and what happens to people, regardless of their understandings' (Sayer 2000:56). 
There is no one-to-one correspondence between the biological and the social or psychological but 
we cannot simply 'write out nature' (Sayer 2000:98). 
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Scalar reductionism    
I am using this broad heading to describe explanations which focus excessively on either proximal 
or distal factors. However it is not only a matter of physical distance, as it also considers 
explanations which overemphasise either structure or agency. This is a particular mode of what 
Sayer (2010:6) calls reducing 'the explanations of multiply-determined processes to a few elements, 
ignoring others within the same stratum'.  
c) A common problem in the contemporary politics of education is individualist explanation which 
pays scant attention to social structures, and which conveniently 'attributes to individuals sole 
responsibility for their fates' (Sayer 2010:7). We can see this acutely in Conservative explanations 
of poverty, as well as their emphasis on individual 'social mobility' (Littler 2018). A further 
example, on a larger scale (meso without macro), is looking within a situation and not beyond, for 
example School Improvement studies which look at a school in isolation without paying attention to 
the effects of the wider policy framework, economic pressures or social environment, and which 
can lead to 'no excuses' evaluations of school attainment data.  
This is  clearly not just a matter of spatial relations, but is reflected by longstanding disagreements 
in sociology about the relationship between structure and agency. Although structure often works 
through individuals, individual action cannot be understand without reference to large-scale 
structures: as Bhaskar (1979:35) expresses it, 'a tribesman implies a tribe, the cashing of a cheque a 
banking system'. 'The social structure... is always already made' but conversely social structures and 
forces are changed by individual agency (ibid:42seq). Developing this further, Archer points to the 
importance of time scale: structures 'pre-date any particular cohort of occupants / encumbants... 
agency does not create structure, but only reproduces or transforms it' (Archer 1995: 168). Structure 
is not always distinguished from agency on the basis of scale: key features of social structure and 
context are 'so to speak, built into the individual' (Lukes 1968:125).  
d) The opposite mistake is a failure to look at particulars. This takes various forms, from over-
generalisation to sociological determinism. It also occurs when key words reify complex patterns 
and agglomerate a wide range of meanings (Rose 2005: 280); good examples in education might be 
'leadership' or 'disadvantage'. The neglect of specificity or context reflects a failure to recognise that 
social situations (like most natural ones) are open systems, where multiple forces are at work which 
can contradict as well as reinforce each other (Bhaskar 1978:1979). Moreover, in social situations 
we also need to consider individual agency. 
This argument has implications for theorising, as the process of abstraction implicitly involves 
removing complexity in favour of a clear identification of key forces. It suggests a need to rebuild 
complexity after any stage of abstraction, theorisation, modelling or experimentation.  
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Temporal reductionism 
e) Treating situations as if they were closed (standardised, predictably regular, mechanistic etc.) can 
close our eyes to emergence. The multiple factors involved do not simply combine additively, but 
can result in exponential or qualitative change. As Sayer (2010:14-15) explains:  
Where the interaction of objects produces changes in the structure, powers, and 
susceptibililties of those objects, it can prompt the development of emergent powers - 
powers not independently or merely additively possessed by those objects. 
Neglect of the temporal dimension also involves a failure to take account of the weight of history. 
As Bhaskar points out, the social structure is 'always already made'. Although people reproduce, 
modify or transform it, they do not create it (1979:42). Moreover, the meaning systems through 
which we view the world (language, discourse, visual aesthetics, ideologies, imaginaries) are 
inherited from the past. A further danger is the smoothing out of historical processes by 
underplaying contradictions. Good examples in education can be found in John Beck's (2007) 
challenge to Stephen Ball's analysis of 'middle class' competitiveness in educational markets, or 
Michael Apple's (1984) critique of the kind of mechanistic marxism which tries to match 
educational situations rigidly to class structures.  
Teleological and ethical reductionism 
Human activity is permeated with a sense of purpose, and activities which lack it are described as 
alienated. That is not to say, however, that agents are always conscious of the significance of their 
actions, some of which are embodied habitus (eg Bourdieu 1977). However teleological reduction 
has become common in the field of education, and endemic in managerialist accounts of  
'leadership', high-stakes accountability, and  much statistically based research including evidence-
based teaching. In all of these, there is a tendency for aims to be taken as read, or for output data to 
be regarded as itself an aim (X 2013a).   
This inevitably leads into the question of values. Sayer (2010:28seq) argues against the dualism 
between 'fact' or 'reason' and 'values' in much social science, and suggests this results in the 
'derationalization of values and the devaluation of reason'. The 'attempted expulsion over the last 
two centuries of values from social science' has resulted in the displacement ('ghettoization') of 
normative thought into moral and political philosophy (p29; see also Flyvbjerg 2001.) The desire to 
appear 'scientific' makes teleological reductionism more likely, given that the development of 
modern science required human purpose to be put out of the frame in the interest of objectivity. 
There is an alignment too with the wider political culture examined by Harvey (2010) who speaks 
of 'an astonishing pepriod in which politics has been depoliticised and commodified'.  
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The critical realist challenge: causality, stratification, emergence 
The preceding section has looked at various types of reductionist simplification, resulting in 
inadequate understandings of reality. This section aims to develop and deepen the argument by 
contrasting Critical Realist approaches to ontology and epistemology with an empiricism derived 
ultimately from David Hume. Although Humean empiricism is often tacit and unacknowledged, it 
is inherent in much experimental and statistical work in education and other social sciences. The 
critique of empiricism is not, of course, an argument against the need to empirically test out 
theories, or an invitation to engage in anti-realist or anti-materialist belief systems, but rather a 
challenge to inadequate versions of materialism or realism.  
The empiricist error begins with Hume's sceptical argument that however many times one billiard 
ball hits another and the second ball moves, we still cannot assert a causal relationship. In other 
words, scientific laws can only express regularity, since we cannot get hold of the causal 
mechanism. Critical realists such as Bhaskar (1978) turn this round by distinguishing (1) the real, 
(2) the actual, and (3) the phenomenal. They argue that causal forces (the real) do not always 
actualise, and even when they do they may not be easily visible.  
Causal laws must be analysed as tendencies, which may be possessed unexercised and 
exercised unrealized, just as they may of course be realized unperceived (or undetected) by 
anyone. (Bhaskar 2011:16) 
In open systems, forces may be real (level 1), and formulable as scientific laws, without resulting in 
regularity (levels 2 and 3), since other forces are at work or the environment is unconducive.  
Critical Realism, as a meta-theory of both natural and social reality - and consequently natural and 
social sciences - directly challenges the Humean emphasis on regularity. In Sayer's words:  
The conventional impulse to prove causation by gathering data on regularities, repeated 
occurrences, is therefore misguided: at best these might suggest where to look for candidates 
for causal mechanisms. What causes something to happen has nothing to do with the 
number of times we observe it happening. (Sayer 2000:14) 
Consequently the purpose of experiments is to artificially simplify and close situations in order to 
make a particular relationship more visible. Experiments are designed to stabilise other mechanisms 
or forces in order to highlight the impact of the dependent and independent variable chosen for 
investigation. Reductionism becomes a danger when the experiment is assumed to mirror reality, 
rather than being a simplified model of particular aspects. (The implications for quasi-experiments 
such as RCTs is discussed later.) Biologist Steven Rose explains that: 
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Effective experiments demand the artificial controls imposed by the reductive methodology 
of the experimenter, but we must never forget that as a consequence they provide at best  
only a very simplified model, perhaps even a false one, of what happens in the blooming, 
buzzing, interactive confusion of life at large, where things rather rarely happen one at a 
time. (2005:28)  
Further: 
What happens in the test-tube may be the same, the opposite of, or bear no relationship at all 
to what happens in the living cell, still less the living organism in its environment.. 
Reductionism is not enough when I come to try to interpret my own experiments. (p79) 
This presents a dilemma for scientists which Stephen Rose and Hilary Rose (1976:96) resolve as 
follows:  
Reductionism as an experimental approach has been at the heart of the scientific method 
ever since the emergence of modern physics with Galileo and Newton. As an experimental 
method, reductionism is merely a procedure for explaining the properties of simplified,  
model systems, of holding all parameters except one constant, and varying that 
systematically.... Problems only arise when the tool is elevated into a philosophical 
principle, so that it is ignored that, for a complete explanation of an event or a process, it 
must be taken out of the vacuum into which reductionism plunges it and replaced in the 
bustle of the real world with which it is, in actuality, in constant interaction.  
As well as openness, an understanding of the complexity of the world requires a sense of 
stratification, both ontological and epistemological. The principles of Newtonian mechanics, 
involving the movement of solid objects, cannot be applied directly to life sciences or to society. 
Life sciences involve a recognition of how organisms interact with environments, how  organisms 
develop based on species-specific and individual genetic directions, how metabolic processes 
become self-sustaining in appropriate environments, and so on. Rose argues that 'it is in the nature 
of living systems to be radically indeterminate, to continually construct their - our - own futures, 
albeit in circumstances not of our own choosing' (p7). Thus, emergence is intrinsic to living 
organisms, which combine change with persistence, and mathematics is generally inadequate to 
model this. 'Equilibrium mathematics deals with closed systems... but living systems are not sealed 
off in this way.' (p162)  
There is, as Archer (1995:34) argues, an association between empiricism and individualism: 
empiricist methods favour individualism, or at least the activities of small groups, because they are 
directly visible, unlike social structures. Popper, for example, insisted that 'all social phenomena, 
 8 
and especially the functioning of social institutions, should be understood as resulting from the 
decisions, actions, attitudes etc. of human individuals' (1945:98). Crucially, reducing the social 
world to the actions and decisions of individuals or aggregates of individuals amounts to a failure to 
see how social structures, albeit often not directly visible, are causally efficacious. Reductionism, in 
this case, fails to understand how rules (even when tacit) regulate conduct, how roles predate their 
incumbents, that role relationships give rise to 'emergent powers' which 'cannot be reduced to those 
of their constituents' (Archer 1995:43-51). For all the efforts of positivists and ethnomethodologists, 
it is difficult to stick with the belief that 'army is just the plural of soldier and all statements about 
the army can be reduced to statements about the particular soldiers comprising it' (Jarvie 1959:57, 
cited Bhaskar 2011:70). 
Structures, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as fixed. They interact to generate complex 
historical change. Consider for example the powerful combination of freedom to buy and sell land, 
enclosures, mercantile imperial expansion, industrial technologies, which led to the powerful 
industrial capitalism shaping society and culture in 19th Century Western Europe. This in turn led 
to neo-imperialism, computer technologies, globalisation, finance capital, and so on, but not in a 
linear process; it resulted in a transformation rather than abolition of capitalism not abolishing it. 
All these forces have deeply affected modern education, creating the circumstances for economic 
and political formations (significantly neoliberalism) to shape new forms of school governance, 
datafication, increasing pressures on childhood, an economistic curriculum... but never absolutely 
determining what will result: 
People... are capable of resisting, repudiating, suspending or circumventing structural and 
cultural tendencies, in ways which are unpredictable because of their creative powers as 
human beings. In other words, the exercise of socio-cultural powers is dependent inter alia 
upon their reception and realization by people: their effect is not direct  but mediated, for 
there are no other ways in which it could be exercised. (Archer 1995:195) 
Collective agency is an unpredictable force. As Apple (1984:251) argues, it is reductionist to 
assume that the education system and its activities can 'be directly read off the economy... a 
correspondence theory can in no way do justice to the complexity of... school life'.  
Social powers do not have to be physical structures (eg bureaucracies, division of labour) but can 
also be cultural norms of expected behaviour (eg new public management, school choice) or 
systems of meaning (discourses). Systems of meaning can condition behaviour as much as physical 
structures do, and hegemonic discourses play an important role in maintaining unequal structures. 
They are not, however, deterministic.  
This inevitably raises concerns about the role and limitations of mathematical representations in 
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research. Whilst statistics enables us to map the world and see a stretch of reality at a glance, it is  
inevitably selective, concealing certain features: it intrinsically tends towards a loss of complexity. 
This is why we should heed Rose's warning, speaking as a biologist: 
Not everything is capable of being captured in a mathematical formula. Some properties of 
living systems are not quantifiable, and attempts to put numbers on them produce only 
mystification. (2005:9)  
The complex dynamics of emergence and stratification of powers in open systems present multiple 
challenges to social science, making diverse variants of reductionism a constant threat, as scientific 
methodologies are applied which do not measure up to the ontological complexity. 
Finally, of course, emergence is central to the field of education: indeed emergence is precisely 
what education is about. Consequently it is rare that children are equally talented in all areas, which 
is somewhat inconvenient for advocates of unitary intelligence. It means that children rarely 
progress in smooth linear ways, which radically undermines the mechanics of test-based 
accountability systems. Further implications of critical realism for education will be discussed later.   
Reductionism in the education field: pedagogy and the learner  
The history of 20th Century pedagogical theory can be written as a struggle against reductionism, 
and which was seminal in its two leading figures Dewey and Vygotsky. Reich and colleagues 
(2016:102)) summarise Dewey's contribution as 'constant struggle against behaviourism and 
instrumental reductionism... insistence on context' with behaviourism guilty of forgetting 
'emotional, social and cognitive aspects of experience'. Bringing the argument up to date, these 
authors speculate on Dewey's reaction to contemporary versions of reduction 'for example, in 
neurscience where the mind is reduced to the brain' (103).  
Vygotsky first made his mark with a direct challenge to Pavlovian behaviourism (known at the time 
as reflexology) in a speech at the Second All-Russian Congress of Psychoneurologists in 1924. The 
clearest statement of his position appeared the following year in Consciousness as a problem of the 
psychology of behaviour (Vygotsky 1925), an exemplary critique of the reductionism of this crude 
materialism which ignored consciousness and was overreliant on the stimulus-response reflex (S-
R).  
Within several pages, Vygotsky has challenged the 'reflexologists' for:  
 failing to distinguish between human and animal behaviour; 
 inappropriately using physiology to explain psychology;  
 refusing to think about consciousness or language;  
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 assuming that observable behaviours are sufficient for building a theory;  
 a neglect of historical and social dimensions.  
Some brief quotations will show the power of this critique:  
Any principal distinction between animal behaviour and human behaviour is obliterated. 
Biology devours sociology and physiology devours psychology. Human behaviour is 
studied as the behaviour of a mammal. What is essentially new, what consciousness and 
psyche brings in human behaviour, is ignored. (§1.3)  
By ignoring the problem of consciousness psychology has deprived itself of access to the 
study of some rather complex problems of human behaviour. It is forced  to restrict itself to 
explaining no more than the most elementary connections between a living being and the 
world.  (§1.1) 
Far from aligning with Marxism, as its advocates assumed (Kozulin 2005), this reductionist version 
of materialism lacks any emancipatory potential. The reflexologists had failed to grasp the most 
basic difference between human beings and animals:  
Whereas animals passively adapt to the environment, man actively adapts the environment 
to  himself... The spider that weaves his web and the bee that builds his cell out of wax do 
this out of  instinct, mechanically, always in the same way, and in doing  so they never 
display any more activity than in any other adaptive reactions. But the situation is different 
with a weaver or an architect. As Marx said, they first built their works in their heads; the 
result of their labours existed before this labour in ideal form. (§2) 
There is no room for imagination and creativity in the behaviourist vision of human learning.  
Following a precise imminent critique, Vygotsky moves on to look at humanity from other 
perspectives. He points to three key advantages of human learning: 'historical experience, social 
experience, and doubled experience'(§2). 
All our life, our labour and behaviour draw broadly on the experience of former generations, 
which is not transmitted at birth from father to son. We may provisionally designate this as a 
historical experience... 
If I know the Sahara and Mars although I have never travelled outside my country and have 
never looked into a telescope, obviously the origin of this experience is due to the 
experience of other people who have travelled to the Sahara and have looked into a 
telescope... Let us call this the social component of our behaviour... 
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Citing Marx's famous reference to spiders and weavers, bees and architects, he explains 'doubled 
experience' in terms of labour repeating  
what had already been done beforehand in the worker's imagination... It is this doubled 
experience that enables man to develop forms of active adaptation that do not exist in 
animals. (§2)   
This is why play is so important:  it is crucially an occasion for the emergence of new meanings 
(Vygotsky 1978:92-104). The current 'schoolification' of early years education in England 
(Bradbury 2018) erodes the foundations of expansive learning.  
As Blunden deduces, reductionist psychology not only results in very limited understanding, it 
debases our humanity by disempowering us: 
The aim of controlling human behavior answers to the needs of capitalist, prison guard,  
interrogator, marketer, politician and bureaucrat, but an emancipatory psychology aims to 
free people from manipulation so that they can have voluntary control over their own 
behaviour. (Blunden 2012:127) 
He singles out four key features of behaviourism: 
1) its aim is the prediction and control of people's behaviour 
2)  it excludes the use of evidence offered by the experimental subject  
3) it excludes the notion of consciousness, and 
4) it is a part of natural science, dealing with human beings as uncultured animals. (ibid) 
Furthermore, in concluding his speech to the 1924 Congress, Vygotsky anticipates the Critical 
Realist argument that we need to go beyond the immediately visible  in order to understand the 
deeper forces at work.  
We should not forget that there are whole sciences that cannot study their subject through 
direct observation! The historian and the geologist reconstruct the facts (which already do 
not exist) indirectly... Similarly, the psychologist is often in the position of the historian and 
the geologist. Then he acts like a detective who brings to light a crime he never witnessed. 
(Vygotsky 1926) 
Bringing this up to date, Bakhurst (1997:156) reminds us that behaviourism is only one of two 
major forms of psychological reductionism: the other is 'physicalism', i.e. the 'attempt to analyse 
mental states in terms of brain states, arguing that the mind is just the working brain'. If 
behaviourism lives on in educational practice in attempts to teach literacy exclusively as phonic 
correspondences, drawing on stimulus-response techniques, 'physicalism' can be found in 
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fashionable appeals to 'brain-based learning' and the belief that brain scans provide an adequate 
description of thinking. Contrary to this, Vygotsky's insistence on the connectedness of the 
individual mind with culture, history and society, and the pivotal importance of active meaning-
making through speech and other sign systems, lays the basis for a wide array of pedagogies which 
are not limited to the acquisition of pre-established facts: dialogic,  place-based, investigative, 
dramatic, problem-solving, and so on.   
 
Reductionist misunderstandings of poverty-related underachievement  
There are many reductionist pitfalls in theorising the relationship between poverty and schooling. 
An adequate understanding requires bringing together different forms of knowledge (sociology and 
urban geography, curriculum and pedagogy, organisational theory etc), and drawing on appropriate 
disciplinary paradigms for examining a stratified, conflictual and open situation. For example, 
sociological analysis might range from statistical correlations to youth and classroom ethnography.  
Recent years have seen some outstanding research on inequality (eg Dorling 2014; Pickett and 
Wilkinson 2010) revealing acute polarisation of income and ownership. The insights are important 
but it does not identify the underlying causes. For this a systemic understanding of the dynamics of 
finance capital and neoliberal globalisation are needed, including the mechanisms of exploitation 
and accumulation by dispossession (see Harvey 2005; 2017).  
The same problem arises with Standing's (2011) widely accepted notion of  'precariat'. Leaning 
towards the deficit 'underclass' theories (Murray 1996) which underpin derogatory 'poverty porn' 
accounts of working class life, this concept misses the point that wage workers (Marx's original 
definition of proletariat) are inherently precarious, given that their position in the economic system 
is defined by not owning the means of production and therefore depending for work on the small 
minority who do. This intrinsic precarity is exaggerated by the economic powers of globalised 
capital, and the diminished power of workers in societies defined by neoliberalism. Precarity is not 
simply the condition of a distinct social group of unskilled, unemployed or marginally employed, 
but increasingly affects large sections of population, including many employees with good 
qualifications and in white-collar or professional work.  
This understanding, however, requires a theoretical understanding of class which does not rely on 
surface appearances such as lifestyle (as with Savage 2015). Even in Marx's time: 
the largest group of wage labourers was not the industrial working class but domestic 
servants, most of whom were female. The working class, then, is not always male, brawny 
and handy with a sledgehammer. (Eagleton 2011:171) 
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An understanding of the educational impact of poverty requires stratification. The concept of class 
is rooted in economics, and it is exploitation and dispossession rather than cultural reproduction that 
generates poverty - people are poor because of exploitative work conditions not the bad habits of 
underclass parents. At the same time we have to recognise the interactions between economics, 
culture and psychology, without allowing culture or psychology to b (X 2013; Y&X 2013). To 
recognise the major influence of  parents' qualifications on children's attainment (Sammons et al 
2008) is not to deny economics, but to recognise the cultural means by which economic advantage 
transmits between generations (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990).  
Reductionist understandings of the link between social position and educational achievement take 
many forms, but crucially omit key layers and causal forces. For example, blaming teachers for low 
attainment fails to take seriously the economic, cultural and psychological pressures. Conversely 
theories of genetically inherited intelligence represent a reduction of psychological to biological 
explanations. The 'lack of aspiration' argument, and the demand for greater personal 'resilience', 
shifts the burden to individualistic psychological explanations, forgetting that it is difficult to 
sustain high aspirations without corresponding opportunities. The Conservative reframing of social 
justice as 'social mobility' within an assumed meritocracy (Littler 2018) is a denial of structure and 
inflation of individual potentiality.     
Much of the statistical data generated to track the link between poverty and education is short on 
theory, and whilst acknowledging that correlation is not causality, the texts are full of casual 
conclusions that 'X causes Y' (Gorard and See 2013:22). Further, important distinctions which 
would allow the complex realities to speak through the data are often missing, as  with the overuse 
of free school meal entitlement (FSM) as a proxy indicator of poverty. The simple binary FSM / 
notFSM does not reflect the intense multiple deprivation experienced by young people in 
deindustrialised areas or run-down coastal towns. The absence of FSM entitlement covers 
everything from extreme affluence and privilege to being seriously poor but unable to meet the 
official FSM criteria. The FSM category does not reflect unhealthy housing conditions, low levels 
of parental qualifications or occupations, or the fatalism and disillusionment which results from 
growing up in a deindustrialised region. Even complex multiple regression analysis can only deal 
with averages and suggest tendencies, and does not cope well with tracing paths of influence. The 
mathematics of tendencies and effects, which is at basis additive / subtractive, cannot reflect the 
possibility that a combination of influences, including adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), can 
create a tipping point.  
A  non-reductionist attempt to 'close the gap' must look beyond as well as within the school. This 
would surely involve preventing child poverty, free activity schemes in school holidays, looking at 
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how teachers understand the lives of the communities they serve, and so on. To theorise this 
requires bringing together different sub-disciplines of education, and sociology on a macro-, meso- 
and micro-level. It also requires considering such organisational / pedagogical factors as 
segregation by 'ability', the impact of high-stakes accountability on teacher recruitment, or the need 
to enrich young people's experience.  
Reductionist theories of school development 
School evaluation and development are understood in many countries through paradigms of School 
Effectiveness (SE) and School Improvement (SI). Recurrent keywords such as accountability, 
effectiveness and leadership work ideologically by emphasising technical rationalism, eclipsing 
questions of political or moral purpose.  
School Effectiveness is a quantitative paradigm which calculates the relative impact of a school on 
student learning, and then attempts to identify what has brought that about. Endemic is:  
 a methodological reductionism (e.g. mechanistic causality, including the assumption of 
linear cause-and-effect relationships);  
 contextual reductionism (a failure to examine environmental influences when tracing causal 
relationships internal to a school). 
Methodological reductionism is exemplified by assumptions of simple linear pathways of influence, 
as inputs lead to higher test scores; whereas in reality key factors can operate recursively, events 
operate as catalysts, forces contradict each other or fail to actualise due to adverse context - indeed 
all the complex possibilities understood by critical realism (see earlier). Contextual reductionism 
includes the tendency of neoliberal accountability systems to treat schools as isolated entities, 
disconnected from pupils’ lifeworlds beyond school, youth culture, commercial influences or 
indeed the effects of the national education system. 
The harnessing of School Improvement theory to School Effectiveness reinforced teleological 
reductionism, by privileging attainment data as the only important aim of education. Keywords such 
as vision, mission and values are not only hollowed out terms, they are a kind of spiritual or vitalist 
add-on which disguises the values reductionism of the post-1990 SI paradigm. The previous 
emphasis on willing thoughtful participation, whilst surviving as rhetoric, was replaced by top-
down power relationships of a system defined by surveillance and control (X 2004; Gunter 2001; 
Hargreaves 1994). There is no concession that some innovations are ill-conceived, that 
professionals have a right and duty to question them, or that some changes should be resisted. 
Causation is poorly conceptualised by SE's list of 'key characteristics', which reify potentially 
significant activities, concerns and interaction, and are in any case too vague and ambiguous to be 
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helpful. What, for example, does 'a focus on teaching and learning' mean? It could be anything from 
transmission of Hirschian lists of facts (Hirsch 1987) to place-based discovery methods. An 
emphasis on assessment might mean anything from authentic assessment or Assessment for 
Learning to high-stakes testing: to see all of this as beneficial forgets the collateral damage which 
high-stakes accountability entails.     
Another major keyword is culture, potentially a very powerful concept because it bridges between 
material and spiritual: culture is matter which means something, as when an artist reshapes material 
to convey a meaning. This complex concept has been reduced from a powerful tool for examining 
patterns of life and their inherent value to a means of domestication and control. This is exemplified 
in Deal and Peterson's (1999) argument that the headteacher’s role is ‘to manage culture’. 
An alternative non-reductive understanding of school culture would recognise the inequalities of 
power and the dynamic interrelation of school world and lifeworld, enabling a conversation about 
how some schools are able to moderate the impact of disadvantage. This might involve, for 
example:  
 examining the cultural messages of classrooms which are dominated by the teacher’s voice, 
closed questions and rituals of transmission of superior wisdom; 
 developing a better understanding of cultural difference in order to prevent high levels of 
exclusion; 
 understanding how tacit assumptions about ‘ability’ and ‘intelligence’ are worked out in 
classroom interactions; 
 discovering how tacit assumptions about single parents and ‘dysfunctional’ working-class 
families operate symbolically in classroom interactions. (X, 2003: 36–7) 
An empowerment culture which enables marginalised young people to develop as learners and 
members of society might involve, for example, teamwork in planning social-constructive and 
coooperative learning; curriculum which connects with students' lives while building towards 
powerful academic knowledge; a school ethos which enable learners to find a voice; and a counter-
culture to the despair of an impoverished or oppressed community.  
Using culture in this sense would avoid reductionism: it does not neglect power, difference, 
privilege, barriers of communication, differences of perspective, or the links between practices and 
(explicit or tacit) theories. It remains open to contradictions and tensions within the school, and 
between the school and the outside world (see Alvesson 2002), 
The naively positive developmental models of change used in mainstream School Improvement are 
reductionist simplifications. Schools require a better understanding of open systems, and could even 
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learn from the science of living things, in order to reference openness, scale, stratification, 
complexity, systemic pressures and human purpose. One alternative would be to emulate (but not 
just copy) ecological models: 
 The evolution of living systems is self-organising and dynamic (i.e. not simply the result of 
causes, but of a long and accident-prone learning history on the system-environment 
border). 
 Developments can only be sustained if they have an equilibrium between innovation, 
verification and preservation. 
 Development takes place through exchange effects, more exactly, through the 
synchronisation of processes on the macro and micro levels. (Schools must connect effects 
on a personal and social plane. School development involves personal, social and 
organisational learning.) 
 The evolution comes about through a reciprocal interplay of biological psychic and social 
development actions. (Learning processes are necessarily holistic – head, heart and hand. If 
you ignore this, you end up with medium- and long-term damage to personal development.)   
(Büeler 1998: 675, summarised in X 2003:26)  
Increasingly school development is seen in terms of leadership, which, despite variants such as 
'distributed leadership', invariably defaults to individualised top-down surveillance and control. A 
rare alternative is Wilkinson and Kemmis's (2014) variation on actor network theory (Latour 2005), 
which recognises the agency of non-humans but without losing the sense of agency due to 
participants' interpretations and intentions. Following Schatzki (2002), its focus is on how 'practice 
architectures' bring together 'sayings, doings and relatings' which are 'not split off from one another' 
but 'hang together' in the overall project of a practice (Kemmis et al 2012:35). These fit within 
wider arrangements: cultural-discursive,  material-economic and social-political preconditions that 
make practices possible. Thus for example what is said within the school is shaped by the 
discourses of the wider society and its views of childhood and education. Such a model avoids the 
default individualism and apolitical neglect of structural power inequality, and the marginal 
recognition of material structural powers, which characterise the majority of  'leadership' thinking.   
The reductionist assumptions of 'evidence-based teaching' 
The methodology of 'evidence-based teaching' (X 2018) - RCTs aggregated through meta-analyses, 
then further amalgamated and compared through what we might call 'meta-meta-analyses' or 'mega-
synthesis' (Hattie 2009 or the Education Endowment Foundation's Toolkit) - is exemplary of 
reductionism in its many forms. There have been powerful challenges to the statistical assumptions 
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(Simpson 2017; 2018; Lilley 2018) but here I will briefly highlight a few arguments which connect 
with issues of reductionism. (See X 2018 for more detailed explanation and illustration.)   
Firstly, the call for Education to imitate Medicine fails to recognise the specifics of particular fields 
and sciences, and loses the complexity and specificity of situations. Its tacit - and mistaken  - 
assumptions are that medical research consists entirely of drugs trials, that the clinical judgement of 
the doctor has become marginal, that there is an easy transfer from findings of drugs trials to 
individual diagnosis and treatment, that double-blind trials are possible in education, and that theory 
is unimportant. Fundamental assumptions of drugs trials are impossible in teaching, including 
double blinding and  'placebo': what exactly should your 'control group' be doing - a deliberate 
avoidance of the behaviour under investigation or 'business as usual'? Imagine the simple case of an 
RCT about the benefit of more open questions: should the control group experience only closed 
questions, or should the teacher simply be asked to do as s/he normally does and not think too much 
about the type of question? As Pawson states: 
This is not the world in repose. This is no vacuum... Control groups or control areas are in 
fact kept very busy. (Pawson 2006:51)  
With regard to theory, Pawson reminds us that:  
Medical treatments... are the embodiment of years of theory-testing. They are already 
scientific inquiry incarnate before the first Phase III RCT is even designed. By this stage, 
medical science knows pretty well how a treatment works and it entrusts to the RCT a 
slightly different question about how well it works in a particular manifestation. (Pawson 
2006:47) 
By contrast,  RCTs in education are frequently lacking in theoretical awareness, and 'treatments' 
applied and evaluated with no attempt to ask why and how they works, in what circumstances, and 
what barriers must be overcome. In other words, the underlying mechanism, structure or force is not 
discussed.  
This reflects the empiricist assumption that the closed situation of experiments sufficiently explains 
what happens in real-world open systems. As Critical Realists explain, experiments are not a 
reflection of reality, and the data does not simply speak for itself.  
That is only the start of the problem. I will highlight some further simplifications here.  
i) Data analysis frequently relies on the reductionist assumption of fairly regular and reliable linear 
progress. This is no longer tenable in accountability data (see analysis from Education Datalab 
2015).  
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ii) Episodes of teaching are not simply 'interventions', but involve dynamic interaction between 
teacher and class which have a path of development, a history, and because they are semiotic rather 
than mechanical, mutual misunderstanding is endemic .  
iii) The classic RCT tries to eliminate the human factor because 'human volition is seen as a 
contaminator' (Pawson 2006:27), whereas social change is brought about through the human agent. 
iv) For all the attempts of system managers to engineer a uniform and standardised system, 
classrooms remain 'open systems' which are ultimately unpredictable. Classroom situations are also 
recursive:  what the teacher does on one day affects pupils' expectations and interpretations the 
next.  
As the higher levels of meta-analysis and mega-synthesis are reached, complexity is progressively 
buried. Feinstein (1995) argued that 'Important inconsistencies are ignored and buried in the 
statistical slurry'. Gene Glass, who originated the idea of 'meta-analysis', has subsequently issued 
this sharp warning about heterogeneity:  
Our biggest challenge is to tame the wild variation in our findings not by decreeing this or 
that set of standard protocols but by describing and accounting for the variability in our 
findings. The result of a meta-analysis should never be an average; it should be a graph 
(cited Robinson 2004:29, my italics).  
Despite this, the biggest and most prominent 'meta-meta-analysis' in English schooling, the EEF 
Toolkit, systematically ignores the 'apples and oranges' problem. Hattie's work too is guilty of 
throwing into the mixing bowl quite incompatible behaviours simply because they are referred to by 
a similar name ('feedback', for example). (X 2018; Lilley 2017]  
Final remarks 
This paper has examined multiple forms of reductionism, including the deep shortcomings of an 
empiricist philosophy of natural and social science. This is not to undermine ontological realism or 
the need to empirically verify or exemplify ideas, but to insist on stronger foundations and 
methodologies. It has argued the need to attend to openness, stratification and emergence.  
The reductionist problems highlighted here have deep historical roots. Because modern science 
began with Galilean and Newtonian mechanics, its principles are often assumed to apply across the 
board including life sciences and indeed social fields. This can be seen in Tom Bennett's (2013) 
populist diatribe against 'non-scientific' research in education, and the accusation that research 
which does not emulate lab experiments is quackery. 
Stephen Rose has referred to the 'physics envy' of many biologists. We are faced with something 
like 'engineering envy' among many educational statisticians and policy makers desperate for 
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efficiency and certainty. This accompanies an increasing faith that neuroscience and behavioural 
genetics will open the window to understanding cognition.  
Biesta (2010:496) presents the case that, in education, we are dealing with open, recursive, semiotic 
systems: 
 open because they interact with their environment and do not operate deterministically; 
 recursive between they 'feed back into themselves, so that the behaviour of the system is the 
result of a combination of external factors and internal dynamics' 
 semiotic because they 'do not operate through physical force but through the exchange of 
meaning'. 
Even this is too straightforward. In formal education, we are actually dealing with multiple nested  
and interlocking systems (the individual learner, groups, classrooms, the accountability machine) 
and various forms of interaction and interface (teacher-pupil, teachers-management, school-
parents). Learners are pulled between schoolworld and lifeworld - particularly challenging if there 
is a distance between school and community cultures. Even a solo act of learning involves 
interaction between subject and object, mediated by various instruments and cultural tools', in a 
dance involving backwards and forwards motion between abstract concepts and sensory experience. 
And this is not even to begin considering social, economic and cultural power differences or the 
politics of curriculum.  
Education is fundamentally about emergence, which operates at the various interfaces mentioned 
above. The quest for certainty and efficiency, though probably inevitable for formal schooling 
(Biesta 2015), is unattainable and undesirable if taken too far. Education (Bildung, pedagogy) turns 








Alvesson, M. (2002). Understanding organizational culture. London: Sage. 
Apple, M (1984) Against reductionism (essay review). History of Education Quarterly 24(2) 
Archer, M (1995) Realist social theory: the morphogenetic approach. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Bakhurst, D (1997) Activity, consciousness, and communication. In M Cole, Y Engeström and O 
Vasquez (eds) Mind, culture and activity: Seminal papers from the Laboratory of Comparative 
Human Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Beck, J (2007) Education and the middle classes: Against reductionism in educational theory and 
research. British Journal of Educational Studies 55(1)  
Bennett, T (2013) Teacher proof: why research in education doesn’t always mean what it claims, 
and what you can do about it. London: Routledge 
Bhaskar, R (1978) A realist theory of science. Hassocks: Harvester Press 
Bhaskar, R (1979) The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary 
human sciences. London: Routledge 
Bhaskar, R (2011) Reclaiming reality: A critical introduction to contemporary philosophy. London: 
Routledge 
Biesta, G (2010) Why 'what works' still won't work: From evidence-based education to value-based 
education. Studies in the Philosophy of Education 29, 491-503 
Biesta, G (2015) Improving education through research? From effectiveness, causality and 
technology to purpose, complexity and culture. Policy Futures in Education, 14(2), 194-210 
Blunden, A (2012) An interdisciplinary theory of activity. Leiden: Brill 
Bock,, I and Goode, J eds (1998) The limits of reductionism in biology. Chichester: John Wiley 
Bourdieu, P (1977) Outline of a  theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Bourdieu, P and Passeron, J-C (1990) Reproduction in education, society and culture (second 
edition). London: Sage 
Bourdieu, P and Passeron, J-C (1990) Reproduction in education, society and culture (second 
edition). London: Sage 
Bradbury, A (2018) Datafied at four: The role of data in the 'schoolification' of early childhood 
education in England. Learning, Media and Technology (online)  
Büeler, X (1998) Schulqualität und Schulwirksamkeit. In H Altrichter et al (eds) Handbuch zur 
Schulentwicklung. Innsbruck: StudienVerlag 
Clarke, M (2012) The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy. Critical Studies in Education 
53(3), pp297-310 
Deal, T and Peterson, K (1999) Shaping school culture. San Francisco: Wiley 
Dennett. D (1995) "Darwin's Dangerous Idea." The Sciences 35(3), pp34-40 
Dorling, D (2014) Inequality and the 1%. London: Verso 
Feinstein, A (1995) Meta-analysis: Statistical alchemy for the 21st Century. Journal of Clinical 
Epidemiology 48(1), 71-9 
Eagleton, T. (2011) Why Marx was right. New Haven: Yale University Press 
 21 
Education Datalab (2015) Seven things you might not know about our schools. 
http://www.educationdatalab.org.uk/getattachment/Blog/March-2015/Seven-things-you-might-not-
know-about-our-schools/EduDataLab-7things.pdf.aspx  
Engels, F (1964) Dialectics of nature (3rd revised edition). Moscow: Progress Publishers  
Feinstein, A (1995) Meta-analysis: Statistical alchemy for the 21st Century. Journal of Clinical 
Epidemiology 48(1), 71-9 
Flyvbjerg, B (2001) Making social science matter: why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed 
again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Gorard, S and See, B (2013) Overcoming disadvantage in education. London: Routledge 
Gunter, H (2001) Leaders and leadership in education. London: Chapman 
Hargreaves, A (1994) Changing teachers, changing times: Teachers' work and culture in the 
postmodern age. New York: Teachers College Press 
Harvey, D (2005) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Harvey, D (2010) The enigma of capital and the crises of capitalism. London: Profile Books 
Harvey, D (2017) Marx, capital and the madness of economic reason. London: Profile Books 
Hattie, J (2009) Visible learning: A synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement. 
London: Routledge 
Hirsch, E (1987) Cultural literacy: What every American needs to know. Boston MA: Houghton 
Mifflin 
Kemmis, S., Edwards-Groves, C., Wilkinson, J., & Hardy, I. (2012). Ecologies of practices. In P. 
Hager, A. Lee, & A. Reich (Eds.), Practice, learning and change (pp. 33–49). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Kozulin, A (2005) The  concept of activity in Soviet psychology: Vygotsky, his discplines and 
critics. In H Daniels (ed) An introduction to Vygotsky (2nd edition) London: Routledge  
Latour,  (2005) Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Littler, J (2018) Against meritocracy: culture, power and myths of mobility. London: Routledge 
Lukes, S (1968) Methodological individualism reconsidered.  British Journal of Sociology, 19(2). 
Murray, C (1996) The emerging British underclass. London: Institute of Economic Affairs 
Lilley, G (2017)  Feedback. visablelearning.blogspot.com/p/feedback.html (accessed 7.1.19) 
Lilley, G (2018) Effect size. visablelearning.blogspot.com/p/effect-size.html (accessed 7.1.19) 
Pawson, R (2006) Evidence-based policy: A realist perspective. London: SAGE 
Pickett, J and Wilkinson, R (2010) The spirit level: why equality is better for everyone. London: 
Penguin 
Popper, K (1945) The open society and its enemies (4th edition). London: Routledge   
Prigogine, I and Stengers, I (2017) Order out of chaos: man's new dialogue with nature (revised 
edition). London: Verso 
Reich, K, Garrison, J and Neubert, S (2016) Complexity and reductionism in educational 
philosophy: John Dewey's critical approach in 'Democracy and Education'. Educational philosophy 
and theory 48(10)   
Robinson, D (2004) An interview with Gene V Glass. Educational Researcher, 33(3), 26-30 
Rose, S (2005) Lifelines: life beyond the gene (revised edition). London: Vintage 
 22 
Rose, S and Rose, H (1976) The politics of neurobiology: biologism in the service of the state. In H 
Rose and S Rose (eds) The political economy of science: ideology of/in the natural sciences (pp 96-
111). London: Macmillan 
Sammons P et al (2008) Influences on children's attainment and progress in Key Stage 2: cognitive 
outcomes in Year 6. EPPE 3-11 project, DCSF Research Report DCSF-RR048 
Savage, M (2015) Social class in the 21st century. London: Pelican 
Sayer, A (2000) Realism and social science. London: Sage 
Sayer, A (2010) Reductionism in social science. In R Lee (ed) Questioning Nineteenth-Century 
assumptions about knowledge: II Reductionism (pp 5-39). New York: SUNY Press 
Schatzki, T. (2002). The site of the social: A philosophical account of the constitution of social life 
and change. University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Shapiro, S (1990) Between capitalism and democracy: Education policy and the crisis of the 
welfare state. New York: Bergin and Garvey 
Simpson, A. (2017). The misdirection of public policy: Comparing and combining standardised 
effect sizes. Journal of Education Policy, 32(4), 450-466 
Simpson, A (2018) Princesses are bigger than elephants: Effect size as a category error in evidence-
based education. British Educational Research Journal 44(5) 
Y&X (2013) XXX 
Standing, G (2011) The precariat: The new dangerous class. London: Bloomsbury 
Vygotsky, L (1925) Consciousness as a problem in the psychology of behavior (transl. N Veresov) 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/consciousness.htm 
Vygotsky, L (1926) The methods of reflexological and psychological investigation 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm 
Vygotsky, L (1978) Mind in society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
X (2003) XXX 
X (2004) XXX 
X (2013a) XXX 
X (2013b) XXX 
X (2018) XXX  
 
 
 
 
  
